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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN RAY GARCIA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18973 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, John Ray Garcia, appeals from his 
conviction of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant, John Ray Garcia, was tried by jury on 
September 20-21, 1982i, in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
Judge, presiding. The jury found appellant guilty of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103, (1978). Appellant was sentenced as 
provided for a third degree felony and was placed on probation. 
RELIEF SQJ.[Gfil_ illi Jl.£EJ;;AL 
Repondent seeks affirmance of the convictiun lwlnw. 
STATEMENT OF THE .. f.8l:.T.S 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts set 
forth in appellant's brief. Such additional facts and 
testimony as respondent plans to utilize will be incorporated 
into the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIALIWAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRA-
VATED ASSAULT. 
Appellant was charged in the Information with the 
commission of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103, (1978) as follows: 
[Dlefendant, JOHN RAY GARCIA, assaulted Chuck 
Pitts by attempting to do bodily injury to him 
with unlawful force or violence and intention-
ally caused serious bodily injury to him; and/or 
assaulted Chuck Pitts by attempting to do bodily 
injury to him with unlawful force or violence, 
by the use of a deadly weapon or such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury; • 
Section of the Utah Code Ann. (1978) provides 
in pertinent part that: 
A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in section 76-5-102 
and: 
(al He intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
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(h) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury .. 
(al and (b) of the aggravated assault statute read 
in the disjunctive. Thus, a person will have committed 
aggravated assault if he committed assault and 
intentionally caused serious bodily injury to another QL he 
used a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to have 
produced death or serious bodily injury. 
Appellant claims that the evidence presented against 
him at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of 
aggravated assaulc. Although the jury is the sole judge of the 
facts of the case, of the credibility of the witnesses, and of 
the weight or the evidence, the Utah Supreme Court has the 
right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. State y. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); 
state y. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 19821; State y. 
\'l.il.sQn, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 197Vl; State y. Minousis, 64 
Utah 206, 213, 228 P. 574, 577 (1924). 
The standard of review for sufficiency of the 
evidence is as follows: 
This Court will not lightly· overturn the 
findings or a jury. We must view the evidence 
properly presented at trial in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, and will only 
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interfere when the evidence is so lackinq and 
insubstantial that a reasonable man could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. . . . We also view in a liqht 
most favorable to the jury's verdict those facts 
which can be reasonably inferred from the 
evidence presented to it. "Thus, intent to 
commit [a crime] ... may be found from proof 
of facts from which it reasonably could be 
believed that such was the defendant's intent." 
state v. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 19821 (citations 
omitted). 
Respondent, the State of Utah, proved each element of 
the cnargea offense of aggravated assault at least to the 
extent that a reasonable man could have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant does not contend that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of simple 
assaulc wnich are set out in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978) 
as follows: 
Assault is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury 
to another ••. 
Appellant makes different arguments under the two 
subsections or the aggravated assault statute, 
subsection of which may have been utilized by the jury to 
convict the appellant. There is, in fact, substantial credible 
evidence to support a verdict under either of the subsections. 
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Appellant asserts that there was no evidence to 
,u11port a conviction under subsection (a) of the aggravated 
assauJ.r: statute, whicu provides that a person commits 
aggravated assaulr: if he commits assault as defined in Section 
(quoted aoovel and he intentionally causes serious 
bodily inJury to another. He does not present any discussion 
or argument regarding the specific intent element of subsection 
(al. It the jury believed the testimony of the victim or if it 
drew lugical inferences from the actions and words of appellant 
as by the victim, it could have ascribed the 
requisite intent to the appellant. The victim, Chuck Pitts, 
testified that appellant told him he was going to die prior to 
the victim's and Loretta Martinez' departure from o.c. Tanner's 
parking lot (T. 23). Mr. Pitts further reported that, follow-
ing the inriicr:ion ot injuries upon him by appellant, appellant 
told him that appellant was going to kill him (T. 33). Such 
threats indicate an intent to inflict serious bodily injury. 
Even when there is sharp conflict in the testimony 
between the state and the defendant, there need be only "some 
evidence and circumstances from which the jury might draw 
certain inferences as to specific intent of the defendant." 
State y, Minousis, 64 Utah 206, 212, 228 P. 574, 577 (1924). 
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Here, appellant followed Mr. Pitts and Ms. Martinez ('f. 2S) 'lnd 
engaged in an affray with Mr. Pitts immediately after Mr. Pitts 
arrivea at the parking lot of the Willows Condominiums (T. 
28). According to the testimony of Mr. Pitts, apoellant drove 
up to Ms. Martinez• car at a very rapid rate of speed, jumped 
out or his vehicle running full force, and commenced attacking 
Mr. Pitts IT. 28). Mr. Pitts received blows to the head (T. 
31) which required medical attention (T. 66). Thus, there are 
clearly "some evidence and circumstances" from which the jury 
could draw inferences as to the specific intent of the 
appe1lant. The exist even in light of appellant's 
claim or self-defense, as testified to by Loretta Martinez IT. 
135), and in light or the implied claim of defense of a third 
person, as hinted at in the testimony regarding claimed sexual 
advances by Chuck Pitts against Loretta Martinez. 
Subsection la) also requires proof that appellant 
caused serious bodily injury to the victim, Chuck Pitts. As 
detined at Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-b01(8) and 19) 11978): 
"Boaily injury" means physical pain, illness, or 
any impairment ot physical condition. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that 
creates or causes serious permanent disfigure-
ment, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
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Chuck Pitts testified that his left eye was injured 
J1J1 in'] his encounter with appellant (T. 33), that the corner of 
his left eyebrow is continually pulled up more than it had 
previously been, that he had blurring of vision for some time 
(several months) after the incident and continues to 
occasionally have blurred vision, that his left eye becomes 
fatigued from reading or driving, and that the injury was very 
painful (T. 46). The attending physician, Dr. Bruce Argyle, 
testified as to the specific nature of the eye and eyebrow 
injury sustained by the victim (T. 66) and as to the scar that 
remains as a result ot the injury CT. 73). From the testimony 
of the victim and of the doctor, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that appellant had caused serious bodily injury to 
Chuck Pitts, the victim. 
Appellant contends that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction under subsection (bl of the 
aggravated assault statute, which provides that a person 
commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-j-102 (quoted above} and he uses a deadly weapon 
or sucn means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
There was contradictory testimony as to whether any 
weapon was involved. The victim, Chuck Pitts, testified that 
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appellant had some t 1 pe of instrument, pipe, club, or rod 
probably aoout sixteen to eighteen inches long which apnel lant 
brought against Mr. Pitts' face with appellant's right hand (T. 
30). Mr. Pitts a1so testified that he heard a sound, like the 
metaliic sound or an object hitting, as he and the appellant 
were going to the ground (T. 34). 
Dr. Bruce Argyle testified that Mr. Pitts' injury was 
inconsistent with a blow by the fist or with striking one's 
head on asphalt pavement, but rather was consistent with a blow 
by a cylindrical heavy ooject (T. 67-70). 
Omar Leeman, who was present with Chuck Pitts and 
Loretta Martinez at the Green Street in Trolley Square prior to 
the incident, testified that Loretta Martinez phoned him 
following the incident, and told him appellant had jumped Chuck 
Pitts and had hit him with a pipe (T. 162). 
Scott Ruoinson, a Murray City Police officer who 
investigated the inciaent, testified that Ms. Martinez told him 
it was too dark for her to tell whether Chuck Pitts was hit by 
appellant with some kind of object (T. 169). 
TaKing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the jury·s verdict, reasonable minds need not necessarily 
conclude tpat appellant was without a weapon in the scuffle. 
Tnis true even considering the testimony to the contrary. 
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• Martinez testified that she never saw a pipe, that 
Jppellant had nothing in his right hand when he raised it IT. 
135), and that she did not tell Omar Leeman that appellant hit 
Chuck Pitts with a pipe (T. 173). Dennis Chavez Trujillo 
testified that he was an eyewitness to the fight IT. 150) and 
that there were no weapons or instruments in appellant's hand 
during the encounter (T. 152). Mr. Trujillo also testified 
that appellant carried two pieces of something in his hand IT. 
158), wnicn appellant claims to be inconsistent with the theory 
that he carried away the weapon. Scott Robinson, investigating 
police OLficer. testified that no pipe was found in a search of 
the area where the inciaent took place IT. 85). 
The jury was not ooligated to believe the evidence at 
trial wnicu Wcts most favorable to appellant. State y. 
649 P.2d 91, 97' (Utah Further, when there is 
conflicting evidence, as there was in the instant case, the 
Utah Supreme Court is "ooliged to accept that version of the 
facts which supports the verdict." l..d. at 93. Therefore, 
the jury need not have the testimony most favorable to 
appellant, or that wnicn indicated that there was no weapon; 
and the reviewing court must accept the version of the facts 
which supports the verdict, or that which indicated that there 
was a weapon. 
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Whether there was a weapon used in the scuff le is fl''' 
necessarily dispositive, however. Subsection (bl of the aqqra-
vated assault statute alternatively provides that an aggravated 
assault occurs if a person uses a deadly weapon Q1: such means 
or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. The 
wording is in the disjunctive, so a deadly weapon need not have 
been used for appellant to have committed aggravated assault. 
Dr. Argyle testified that if a pipe had been swung at 
Chuck Pitts so that Mr. Pitts had been struck directly behind 
the eye (slightly behind it in the temple area) rather than his 
having received a glancing blow over the eyebrow, the impact 
could have easily caused death (T. 71). The jury may not have 
believed that there was a weapon but could still have 
reasonably concluded that a direct blow to Chuck Pitt's temple 
with the fist could have produced death or serious bodily 
injury. 
The jury reasonably could have believed that 
appellant was capable, through the use of his fists alone, of 
creating a true risk of death or serious bodily injury for his 
victim, Chuck Pitts. The testimony at trial illuminated the 
age difference between appellant and Chuck Pitts. Appellant 
was just barely over twenty years old at the time of the 
incident, and Cnuck Pitts was nearly forty years old (T. 35). 
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" Chuck P,tts testified that he did not exercise, that he 
wa:; six feet tall and that he weighed 155 pounds (T. 53). 
There was no testimony relative to the height and weight of 
appellant. However, the jury was able to observe appellant and 
to compare his stature and apparent physical condition to that 
of the victim, Chuck Pitts. It could have concluded that 
appe1lant was aole to create a risk of death or serious bodily 
inJury fvr Chuck Pitts. 
The auove-mentioned testimony of Dr. Argyle was the 
sole evidence on the element of the likelihood of the 
production or death. Additionally, the jury was at liberty to 
draw whatever inferences that it reasonably could from all 
direct and circumstantial evidence. 
The jury could have concluded that the victim 
actually suffered serious bodily injury. As discussed above, 
Chuck Pitts had a permanent distigurement in the form of a scar 
and suffered from blurred vision, eye fatigue, and the like. 
On the other hand, the jury could have believed that appellant 
used such means or force likely to cause serious bodily 
injury, wnether it was actually caused or not. The jury needed 
to draw the first conclusion to convict under subsection (a) or 
the second conclusion to convict under subsection (b) of the 
aqgravated assaulL statute. 
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Appellant did not, in his brief, discuss either the 
self-defense theory or the defense of a third person theory 
raised at trial. He did, however, claim the existence of a 
general insufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, respondent 
feels constrained to observe that the mere raising of one or 
more defenses did not automatically create a reasonable doubt 
of appellant's guilt. As previously noted, the jury was the 
sole judge or the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and 
the weight given the testimony. The jury properly elected to 
disbelieve the theories of self-defense and the defense of a 
third person interposed at trial. 
Reasonable minds need not have necessarily 
entertained a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the 
crime. The self-defense issue boiled down to a conflict in 
testimony between the victim, Chuck Pitts, who testified that 
he was assaulted without provoking or first grabbing or hitting 
appellant CT. 30), and the witnesses for appellant. Loretta 
Martinez testified that Chuck Pitts grabbed appellant by 
appellant's chest or neck or something CT. 135) prior to 
appellant's hitting Cnuck Pitts; and Dennis Chavez Trujillo 
testified that Chuck Pitts called appellant a name and grabbed 
appellant before blows were thrown CT. 151). The jury could 
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reasonably have found the victim's testimony more persuasive 
that of appellant's witnesses. 
The defense of a third person theory was founded 
1.1 r gely upon innuendos. Appellant presented some evidence that 
he was defending Loretta Martinez against the sexual advances 
of the victim, Chuck Pitts. The only activity of which 
appellant could have been aware was the kiss shared by Ms. 
Martinez and Mr. Pitts while they were in her car at the O.C. 
Tanner parking lot. Loretta Martinez testified that Chuck 
Pitts kissed her and tried to touch her breast (T. 131). Ms. 
Martinez also testified that she did not know when appellant 
arrived at the O.C. Tanner parking lot (T. 132), that she 
thought appellant had seen the kiss CT. 141), and that she did 
nQt advise appellant that Chuck Pitts was making unwanted 
advances or that she needed help (T. 1421. Thus, there was no 
direct evidence that appellant observed or was otherwise aware 
of Chuck Pitts' allegea sexual advances. Further, there was no 
evidence impropriety in Cnuck Pitts' actions when he and 
Loretta Martinez arrived at the Willows Condominiums parking 
area. 
All of the other testimony concerning the possibility 
of the defense of a third person was given by Loretta Martinez 
(T. 129) and by Micnelle Egan Berry (T. 108-109), who sat with 
Loretta Martinez and Chuck Pitts at the Green Street. The two 
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women claimed that Chuck Pitts put his arm around the back of 
Loretta Martinez' chair, whispered in her ear, and placed his 
arm at least in the direction of, if not directly on, her knee. 
Appellant was not privy to this information and it was, 
therefore, irrelevant. Additionally, Omar Leeman, a business 
acquaintance or the victim's who was the fourth person sharing 
a table at the Green Street on the evening of the incident, 
testified that he dia not see Chuck Pitts whisper in Loretta 
Martinez' ear CT. 99) or otherwise engage in conduct that could 
be cnaracterized as sexual advancement (T. 97). Chuck Pitts 
testified that he dia not remember making any romantic 
overtures (T. 57). 
The testimony concerning the alleged sexual advances 
by Chuck Pitts towards Loretta Martinez was in sharp conflict. 
Even if the jury had believed that Mr. Pitts made such 
advances, the jury would also have concluded that appellant did 
not observe the overtures and was not told about them by 
Loretta Martinez. Because appellant was unaware of the claimed 
actions Ot' Cnuck Pitts, he could not have been going to the 
rescue or Loretta Martinez. The theory that appellant was 
defending Ms. Martinez from the sexual advances of the victim 
was based upon the barest of evidence and did not have to be 
accepted by the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in State y. 
649 P.2d 91, 9/' (Utah 1982): "It is not sufficient 
that on appeal an appellate court views the evidence as less 
than wholly conclusive." Rather, to overturn the guilty 
verdict on a claim that the evidence at trial was insufficient 
for a conviction of aggravated assault, the Utah Supreme Court 
would have to find that reasonable minds would entertain a 
reasonable doubt and that reasonable men could not have reached 
the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. l.Q.. 
There is substantial credible evidence to support the 
conviction of aggravated assault. For the above stated reasons, 
appellant could have reasonably been found guilty on either arm 
of the aggravated assault statute. Thus, appellant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .i.Q___ day Of March, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARBETH w z 
Assistant Attorney General 
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